Odd Essays

Some Random Thoughts

Till Blogs Do Us Part

Mobarak Haider, intellectual, author of three books on the roots of radicalisation in Muslim societies, and a frequent commentator on social networking sites, informed his friends on Facebook on August 10 that a blasphemy case had been filed against him by an individual unknown to him, accusing Haider of preaching Ahmadi beliefs to him.

Members of the Ahmadi community in Pakistan, who were declared non-Muslims through a constitutional amendment during Zulfikar Bhuto’s tenure in 1974, and further restricted from propagating their faith and performing religious rituals similar to those of Muslims through further legislation in the Zia era, have over the years been under constant threat from religious radicals.

Haider’s views on religious radicalism and orthodoxy were well known, and he had never abstained from expressing them. It was almost par for the course then that he would elicit anger in some quarters. How that anger would manifest itself, however, was justifiably serious cause for concern. In many instances, personal enmities, political vendettas, one-upmanship, and even momentary rage over trivial issues, have spurred accusations of blasphemy against individuals. And while some have been charged for the crime – irrespective of evidence to support these charges – and languish in prison, others have become victims of mob justice. In some instances this has resulted in death by often horrific means, like the burning alive of a pregnant woman and her husband – the parents of five children – in a kiln, to cite just one example. Haider thus, must understandably have been alarmed by the charge levelled against him, but he responded in a rather out-of-character way: he went on social media and stated that he had nothing to do with the Ahmadi faith. In fact, he said, he had always been a critic of the Ahmadia movement, in the same way he had opposed other forms of organised religious exploitation. Haider also expressed his firm belief in the finality of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

Many people were shocked by Haider’s reaction to the charges and the way he criticised the already persecuted Ahmadi community. Initially, it was thought that the charges against him were an attempt by Islamic extremists to endanger his life by framing him as a closet Ahmadi, as his views on religious extremism are well known. But individuals  close to him maintain that the charges were levelled against Haider by his old adversaries who, ironically, belong to the Ahmadi sect, which  could perhaps explain his avowed position in his rebuttal to the accusations against him.

As it turned out, the charges against Haider were not filed by religious radicals, and the case was dismissed by the court in the first hearing.

But the saga revealed once again how innocent people can be charged with blasphemy or links to the Ahmadi community and be exposed to serious danger.

Another case in point is the story of a Karachi Building Control Authority (KBCA) official, who was trying to demolish the encroachments made by the custodians of the powerful religious seminary, Jamia Binoria, SITE, Karachi, owned by Mufti Muhammad Naeem. When the official refused to relent to pressure and continued to proceed with the demolition plans, graffiti linking him to the Ahmadi community appeared overnight in the vicinity of the seminary. Finally, he was forced to retreat and even made to apologise for daring to undertake a task that infuriated the influential clergy.

Similarly, there is the case of the lecturer at the department of English in the Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. Junaid Hafeez is currently facing blasphemy charges filed against him for an alleged post he filed in a Facebook discussion group. Initially he was not even able to find a lawyer to defend him. When the human rights defender, Rashid Rehman, took on the task, he was threatened in the presence of the presiding judge and subsequently killed in his office.

Even those who merely spoke in support of the accused were not spared. When Shoaib Adil, editor of the Urdu periodical, Naya Zamana, published a story on the Junaid Hafeez case and the murder of his lawyer Rashid Rehman, he had to face outrage.

Religious radicals lodged an FIR against him and accused him of blasphemy for being the publisher of a book by a former Lahore High Court judge who belongs to the Ahmadi community. The book was published seven years ago, but Adil had to close his office and move to a safer place. Later he left the country. Now his magazine is confined to the online version, and no more print copies are out for sale.

Over the years, these cases and countless others have been widely covered and discussed, but recently another name was added to the list of those allegedly killed for their views – that of blogger, Aniqa Naz, a frequent commentator on Blogistan, an Urdu blog aggregator site. Naz also ran her own blog, Shokhiye Tehrir.

In a video statement released in May this year, posted on various jihadi propaganda sites, Asim Omar, the chief of Al-Qaeda, South Asia, claimed that his group’s affiliates were not only behind the Bangladesh assassinations, but also those of religious scholar and academic, Mohammad Shakil Auj of Karachi University, and Aniqa Naz, the Pakistani Urdu blogger known for her views on rights of women, her opposition to political Islamists, her criticism of religious extremism, and for challenging their activists in the Urdu blogsphere. Her last blog, just a few days before her death in October 2012, was about the attack on Malala Yousufzai by militants.

Bangladeshi students and social activists protest against the killing of Avijit Roy, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Friday, Feb. 27, 2015. Roy, a prominent Bangladeshi-American blogger, known for speaking out against religious fundamentalism was hacked to death by some unidentified people in the capital as he walked with his wife, police said Friday. Posters read, as “we want punishment to Avijit Roy’s killers.”  And  “How many dead bodies we have to see?” (AP Photo/ A.M. Ahad)
Bangladeshi students and social activists protest against the killing of Avijit Roy, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Friday, Feb. 27, 2015. Roy, a prominent Bangladeshi-American blogger, known for speaking out against religious fundamentalism was hacked to death by some unidentified people in the capital as he walked with his wife, police said Friday. Posters read, as “we want punishment to Avijit Roy’s killers.” And “How many dead bodies we have to see?” (AP Photo/ A.M. Ahad)

Asim Omar said that blasphemers have been taught a lesson in France, Denmark, Pakistan and now Bangladesh. He maintained that these individuals had been killed by the Al Qaeda’s Bangladesh affiliates on the orders of Al-Qaeda chief, Aiman al Zawahiri.

In a recent email to the Bangladeshi media, after the murder of the fourth blogger, Niloy Chatterjee (who wrote under the alias Niloy Neel), on Friday, August 7, at his apartment, Ansarul Islam, a militant group affiliated with the Al-Qaeda-South Asia issued the following statement: “We, Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, claim responsibility for this operation as vengeance for the honour of the messenger of Allah. We declare war against the enemies of Allah and His Messenger… we are coming [for] you … If your ‘Freedom of Speech’ maintains no limits, then widen your chests for ‘Freedom of our Machetes’.”

The news of Al-Qaeda’s involvement in Naz’s death was a matter of surprise for her family and friends who assumed she had died in a random traffic accident.

A family associate said, “Aniqa went to pick up Mashal, her daughter, from school; a car hit hers from the back. She wasn’t wearing a seatbelt and had a head injury. She was rushed to the hospital, but did not survive surgery.”

A friend of Amar Mahboob, Aniqa’s husband, adamantly refuted the claim made by Al-Qaeda, maintaining, “I am certain that Aniqa’s death was an accident. Amar, another friend and I closely examined the car and the accident scene and no evidence of foul play or sabotage were found. I have no doubt that the Al-Qaeda story is entirely false.”

That notwithstanding, her name appearing in an Al-Qaeda propaganda video is alarming for those who have been writing against religious radicals and challenging religious ideologies, particularly on the internet, where alternative media forums are flooded by the views of the extremist lobby and their propaganda.

Urdu blogsphere and online forums have more readers and visitors than those in English, but the majority of those who log in to these sites are people with conservative religious opinions, even some with radical views. This makes it unsafe for secularists and liberals, or even moderates to express views that do not conform with theirs.

“You cannot deny the importance of engaging in Urdu. It has a far wider outreach than English, which can only be read and understood by a limited audience,” says Ale Natiq, the founder of an Urdu blog going by the nameRoshni, which has a huge following on social networks. That is certainly unarguable. So creating material that would educate, inform and mould public opinion in the vernacular could prove highly beneficial in shaping hearts, minds and the national discourse. But time is of the essence.

Looking for Taliban equivalents

Looking for Taliban equivalents.

Bestowing artificial legitimacy on aliens?

In a recent opinion piece, Mr Nadir Hassan has drawn parallels between the present-day Taliban and the resistance movements in the federally administrated tribal areas (FATA) in the remote past. The writer asserts that he does not condone the Taliban atrocities but, unfortunately, he appears to rationalise that madness by his attempt to impart legitimacy of sorts by trying to tie them to the past struggles in that region.

Mr Hasan has focused on the anti-colonial, conservative religious figure, the Faqir of Ipi and has compared the Faqir of Ipi’s rebellion against the British Raj with the Taliban. The similarities between the two movements – if the Taliban can be called one – are far and few in between and the comparison is valid only in a very limited scope, if at all.

The writer has, for example, exaggerated the reach and influence of the Faqir’s uprising by calling it one of the ‘most successful rebellions’ which was actually not the case. The fact is the movement by the Faqir of Ipi was quite limited and neither had the capacity to nor did extend outside Waziristan. Like the Taliban’s Pakistani backers, the Faqir’s uprising had its foreign supporters in Germans and Italians. However, unlike the Taliban’s handlers, the Germans and Italians were aware that even with unlimited supplies he could not gather more than a thousand adherents or carry out a serious and sustained assault on British forces. The Faqir’s did conduct the classic hit-and-run guerrilla attacks against the British but really had no strategy to expand the scope of their rebellion, including tying it to the larger independence struggle in British India.

Unlike the highly Arabised and Pakistan-trained Taliban, the Faqir of Ipi’s movement was indigenous in nature, characteristics, norms, scope and influence. It was not driven by an anti-imperial ideology or any mooted anti-colonial phenomena. It erupted on the issue of handing over a Hindu minor girl to her parents by the British administration, following a complaint against a tribal man for abducting, converting to Islam and marrying the girl. The action taken by the British administration, of course, was highly commendable, especially when compared today with the complicity of present-day political and civil administration and the inaction of judiciary in similar cases.

The steps taken by the British administration were nonetheless conceived as an attack on the tribal code as well as against religious norms. The outrage against the perceived British excesses morphed into a decade-long insurgency. The indigenous nature of the revolt by default had to tap the traditional bastions of native culture and power i.e. the jirga (political assembly), hujra (social assembly) and the mosque (religious assembly). The former two power centres overshadowed or at least remained at par with the mosque – an exact opposite of the way Taliban movement evolved and prosecuted war. The Faqir’s men worked with the existing socio-political structures, which is in stark contrast with the Taliban zealots blowing up jirgas and decimating the tribal elders and their hujras. Not a shred of historical evidence suggests that the Faqir’s men went on a killing spree against the tribal leaders, common people, music or poetry recitals, village fairs and play areas, bazaars, shrines or mosques.

The very distinct composition of Taliban-ian Islam (as the writer asserted) is the attempt to bring down the existing socio-political structure and to extend their control by inflicting a puritanical version of Islam and waging a jihad against fellow Muslims considered guilty of idolatry, grave worshipping and adultery. Imposing rigorous prohibitions on music, dance and all forms of arts, and enforce punishments for not observing Islamic rituals, challenging tribal hierarchy and insisting on socio-religious equality of the people to win over support.

In his pursuance of finding out an equivalent from the region to dispel the impression of considering the Taliban as an unprecedented phenomena, he missed that the Faqir of Ipi was not a mullah; he was associated with a Sufi clan, a disciple of Pir Naqib of Charbagh, which makes him a Barelvi. Thus, his version of religion was more in line with the local interpretation of Islam (for instance, it is apparent from the use of music in his war parties).

Also, if he had researched about the descendants of the Faqir of Ipi, he may have found that the successor of the Faqir, his nephew, Niaz Ali Khan, was known for his conciliatory approach in tribal disputes, and his sons Abdul Jaleel, Abdul Wali and others were often inveighed by the local mullahs for inertness toward the religiously glorified war of Afghanistan and the current uproar in FATA.

The Faqir of Ipi’s opposition to the idea of Pakistan came from the political leanings favoured towards Congress and its allies in frontier region, the Khudai Khidmatgars. His support of the Pashtunistan was first influenced by this and later by his contacts in the Afghan Government, which lost grounds after Badshah Khan took an oath of allegiance to Pakistan and his military commander later surrendered to Pakistan.

Taliban roots in political and religious movements on Pashtun lands can be traced to the Wahhabi-influenced movement of Syed Ahmed of Bareli, who sought political control by declaring himself the vanguard of Islam, imposed centralised Sharia Laws, changing Pashtun traditions and norms with their version of Islam and challenging the traditional authority of Pashtun elders as well as the religious clergy by assigning themselves the authorities to arbitrate disputes and collect religious tax, as Zakat and Ushr. These steps by Syed Ahmed and his disciples from across India and among Pashtuns were rejected by the traditional Pashtun leadership as well as clergy. The alien movement ensued in an utter failure

Local tribal elders and people of FATA have the same feelings of agony towards the aliens and monsters aka Taliban; it is state support for perceived strategic interests which have enabled them to continue their beleaguering of FATA.

The writer is a freelance journalist and can be reached at

A Secular Madressah in Sindh

سندھ کا ’سیکیولر‘ مدرسہ

ریاض سہیل

بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام کراچی

ترقی اور تیزی کے ساتھ بدلتی سیاسی، سماجی اور معاشی صورتحال نے کراچی کے روشن ماضی کو دھندلا دیا ہے۔ برطانوی راج کے خلاف جب بھی تحریک چلیں، چاہے وہ سیاسی تھیں یا مسلح، ان کا مرکز ہندوستان کو بتایا جاتا ہے، مگر اس مرکز کی جاندار شاخوں کا تذکرہ بہت ہی کم ملتا ہے جن کے بغیر یہ تحریکیں شاید اتنی کامیاب نہ ہوتیں۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کراچی کا پہلا مدرسہ تھا

کراچی میں موجود مدارس کی پہچان صرف دینی تعلیم ہے۔ چند ہی لوگ اس ایک سو چھبیس سالہ پرانے مدرسہ کے بارے میں جانتے ہوں گے جس کا نام مدرسہ مظہر العلوم المعروف کھڈے والا مدرسہ ہے۔ شاید اس گمنامی کی ایک وجہ ماضی میں اس کا سیکیولر مزاج ہونا ہے۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کا قیام اٹھارہ سو چوراسی میں ہوا تھا۔ یہ کراچی کا پہلا مدرسہ تھا۔ پاکستان کے بانی محمد علی جناح کی درس گاہ سندھ مدرستہ الاسلام بھی اس کے بعد تعمیر ہوا تھا۔ مدرسہ مظھر العلوم کے بانی مولانا عبداللہ میمن تھے جو بنیادی طور پر شاہ بندر ٹھٹہ کے رہائشی تھے۔

اس مدرسے کی وجہ شہرت مولانا عبداللہ کے صاحبزادے مولانا صادق بنے جو دیوبند میں شیخ الہند مولانا محمود الحسن کے پاس زیر تعلیم رہے اور بعد میں ان کی تحریکوں میں ان کے دست راست بھی رہے۔ اسی مدرسے سے فارغ التحصیل مولانا عبید اللہ سندھی سے بھی ان کی دوستی تھی۔ یہ تینوں شخصیات اور ان کی تحریکیں اس مدرسے کی وجہ شہرت بنیں۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کے صدر العلوم غلام مصطفیٰ راجپر کے مطابق جب مولانا محمود الحسن نے جمعیت العلما الہند بنائی تو اسی طرز پر جمعیت العلما سندھ کی بنیاد رکھا گئی، اس وقت سندھ بمبئی کا حصہ تھا۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم

ان کے مطابق انگریز حکومت کے خلاف جب مدرسہ دیوبند کے سابق طالب علموں نے جمیعت الانصار قائم کی تو مولانا صادق اور مولانا عبید اللہ سندھی بھی اس کا حصہ بن گئے جس کے بعد ریشمی رومال اور خلافت تحریک چلائیں گئیں جس میں مسلمانوں اور ہندوؤں نے مذاہب سے بالاتر ہوکر شرکت کی۔

ان تحریکوں کے دوران کانگریس کے رہنما مہاتما گاندھی، مولانا ابوالکلام آزاد اور شیخ الہند محمود الحسن بھی مدرسہ مظہر العلوم آئے۔

دوسری عالمی جنگ میں جب برطانیہ ترکی کی جانب پیش قدمی کر رہا تھا تو اس مدرسے کے مہتمم مولانا صادق نے کراچی میں بیٹھ کر اپنا سیاسی کردار ادا کیا۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کے صدر العلوم غلام مصطفیٰ راجپر کے مطابق اس منصوبہ بندی کا پتہ چلنے پر انگریز حکومت نے مولانا صادق کو گرفتار کرکے صوبے مہاراشٹر کے علاقے کاروار میں نظر بند کردیا جہاں وہ تین سال قید رہے مگر ثبوتوں کی عدم دستیابی کے باعث ان پر بغاوت کا مقدمہ نہیں چل سکا۔

مولانا صادق بھی برصغیر کے ان رہنماؤں میں سے تھے جنہوں نے مذہب کی بنیاد پر تقسیم کی مخالفت کی تھی۔ مولانا غلام مصطفیٰ راجپر کے مطابق ان رہنماؤں کا خیال تھا کہ ’اگر ہندو مسلمان کی بنیاد پر تقسیم ہوگی تو پھر مسلمان کئی فرقوں میں تقسیم ہوجائیں گے اور پاکستان کے موجودہ حالات بتاتے ہیں کہ ان کی پیشنگوئی درست ثابت ہوئی۔‘

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم

شہر کے قدیم علاقے لیاری کے قریب واقع اس مدرسے میں اس وقت بھی تین سو بچے زیر تعلیم ہیں جن میں کراچی اور سندھ کے دیگر علاقوں کے بچے بھی شامل ہیں۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کے صدر العلوم غلام مصطفیٰ راجپر کا کہنا ہے کہ ان کے مدرسے میں تاریخ، یورپ کا فلسفہ، شاہ ولی اللہ اور امام غزالی کی کتابیں پڑھائی جاتی ہیں۔ یہ کتابیں دیگر مدارس میں نہیں پڑھائی جاتیں۔

اس مدرسے میں قدیم لائبریری بھی موجود ہے، جس میں سنہ اٹھارہ سو دس کی بائیبل بھی ہے تو مختلف ممالک کی خارجہ پالیسیوں پر تبصرے کرنے والے بین الاقوامی رسالے فارین افیئر میگزین کا بھی ریکارڈ موجود ہے۔

پاکستان کے قیام کے بعد جمعیت العلما الہند سندھ کے رہنما بھی جمعیت العلما اسلام میں شامل ہوگئے مگر ون یونٹ پر مولانا صادق کے بیٹے مولانا اسماعیل کے قومپرست خیالات کی وجہ سے ان کی راہیں علیحدہ ہوگئیں۔

مدرسے میں جمعیت علما اسلام کے رہنما مفتی محمود کا مولانا محمد اسماعیل کو تحریر کردہ خط بھی موجود ہے جس میں انہیں کہا گیا تھا کہ ان کے بیان سے ایسا لگتا ہے جیسے جی ایم سید بول رہا ہے۔

ان قومپرست نظریات کے باعث اس مدرسے پر ہندوستان کے ایجنٹ ہونے کے الزامات بھی عائد ہوئے اور جنرل ضیاالحق کے دور میں مولانا اسماعیل کو جیل بھی جانا پڑا۔ جنرل ضیا الحق کے دور حکومت میں کالا باغ ڈیم کے منصوبے کے اعلان پر قوم پرست سیاست کا مرکز دریائے سندھ اور اس کا پانی بنا مگر مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کی جامع مسجد میں اس سے کہیں پہلے سے ہر نماز جمعہ میں دریائے سندھ کے بہاؤ جاری رکھنے کے لیے دعائیں مانگی جاتی ہیں۔

مدرسہ مظہر العلوم کے صدر العلوم غلام مصطفیٰ راجپر کا کہنا ہے کہ افغان جہاد کے دنوں میں پیسوں کی بارش ہوئی مگر انہوں نے خود کو اس سے دور رکھا۔اس لیے وہ دیگر مدارس کی طرح کسی بھی قسم کا تعلق نہیں رکھتے صرف مقامی لوگوں کے چندے سے اسے چلایا جاتا ہے۔ ’مالی تنگی میں ضرور ہیں مگر مطمئن ہیں۔

Madrassah reforms : Does PPP want to nourish sectarianism?

Madrassah reforms : Does PPP want to nourish sectarianism?

March 14th, 2010 Ali Arqam(Ist published at

Here is a well written piece about Madrassah reforms by Saiful Islam Khalid. I found this piece in a weekly newspaper from Islamabad. It was in paper print, which I have composed and edited to post it for LUBP viewers:

میاں صاحب کا سیاسی سفر۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔علی ارقم درانی

پچھلی رات  میاں صاحب کے لاہور میں ایک انخابی جلسے میں تقریر کے بعد جب ان کی تقریر کے مندرجات ٹی وی چینلز کی اسکرین پر پٹیوں کی صورت چل رہے تھے۔اسی دوران جلسے کے انتظامات میں سرکاری مشینری کے بھرپور استعمال اور روشنی کے لئے چوری کی بجلی کے استعمال کی خبر بھی گاہے گاہے ان  پٹیوں کا حصہ تھی۔۔دوسری طرف شیخ رشید اے آر وائی پرایک پروگرام میں چیختے چھنگاڑتے نظر آرہے تھے۔میاں صاحب کی پوری تقریر وفا اور بے وفائی کی رومانوی اصطلاحات ، کرپشن اور سوئس اکاءونٹس  اور تبدیلی کی خواہشات کے گرد گھوم رہی تھی۔ میاں صاحب کا پورا سیاسی کیرئراسی طرح کی چند اصطلاحات کا اسیر رہا ہے۔اپنے سیاسی کیرئر کے مختلف اسپیلز میں ان کی قوت بیان ہمیشہ  محدود الفاظ و اصطلاحات کے گرد گھومتی رہی ہے۔ بارہا اس میں کچھ ترمیم و اضافہ ہوتا رہا ہے۔ میاں صاحب کی سیاسی ڈکشنری میں  ان الفاظ کا اضافہ و ترمیم ان کے سرپرستی کرنے والے انڈیویژیولز اور ان کی ہمراہی کرنے والے سیاسی بازیگروں کے مرہون منت رہا ہے۔

جب ان کے ابتدائی کیرئر کا آغاز تحریک استقلال سے ہوا تو اپنے پیش رو جناب اصغر خان کے زیر اثر بھٹو دشمنی کا ابتدائی نصاب مکمل کیا ۔پاکستان کی سیاسی تاریخ کے حوالے سے شارٹ ساٹٹڈ نیس کا شکار احباب یا سیاسی تاریخ کے حوالے سے سیلیکٹیو ایمنیزیا کے شکار احباب کو شاید علم نہ ہو کہ بھٹو شہید کے جوڈیشل مرڈر کی کاروائی کے دوران یہ اصغر خان ہی تھے جنہوں نے سیاسی جلسوں میں ان کی پھانسی کا مطالبہ کیا تھا۔سیاسی جلوسوں میں عدالتی مطالبوں کا فن میاں صاھب نے ان ہی سے سیکھا ہےواللہ اعلم

اصغر خان صاھب کے ہاں ابتدائی علوم کی تکمیل کے بعد آپ جنرل جیلانی کے طفیل اپنے محسن ضیا ء الحق کے ہاں حاظر ہوئے اور زانوئے تلمذ طے کرکے اپنی بی مثل وفادارانہ صلاحیتوں کے طفیل پہلے جاں، پھر جان جاں اور پھر جان جاناں ہوگئے۔وفا کا استعارہ شاید میاں صاحب نے وہی سے مستعار لیا ہے۔

سگمنڈ فرائڈ نے انسان کی شخصیت کی تشکیل میں اس کے بچپن کو بنیاد ٹہرایا ہے اور اور یہ کہا ہے کہ ان اثرات سے انسان پھر پوری عمر جان نہیں چھڑا پاتا میاں صاحب بھی اپنے سیاسی عہد طفولیت کے ابتدائی سالوں کے ضیا ء مرحوم کے اثرات سے چھٹکارا نہیں پاسکے یا شاید وہ اس کے زیادہ خواہش مند نہیں ہیں کہ ضیا ء مرحوم کی سیاسی وراثت کے اثرات ہی ان کی سیاسی فکر کے بنیادی اوصاف ہیں۔ پیپلز پارٹی کی قیادت سے بیر، سیاسی مذہبیت کا فروغ واستعمال  اور اختیارات کے ارتکاز کے حوالے سے ایتھا ریٹیرین طرز فکر ، بیورو کریسی پر انحصار اور سیاسی نمائندگان پر عدم اعتماد اسی سیاسی فکر کا نمونہ ہیں۔

دو مرتبہ اپوزیشن اور دو مرتبہ اقتدار میں رہنے کے دوران پیپلز پارٹی سے دشمنی ،مذہب کے سیاسی استعمال ، کرپشن کے الزامات کے آزمودہ حربوں کے ذریعے مخالفین کی تادیب اور اختیارات کے اپنی ذات میں ارتکاز کی خاطر ہر ایک سے دشمنی لینے کی روش اسی طرزفکر کا شاخسانہ ہے۔ سب سے بڑی غلطی تو ان سے تب ہوئی جب وہ فاروق لغاری کی قائم کردہ نگراں حکومت کے تحت ہونے والے مینڈیٹ کو اتنا حقیقی سمجھ بیٹھے کہ فوج سے بھڑ گئے  اور اٹک قلعے پہنچ گئے وہ تو بھلا ہو ان کے مہربانوں کا کہ انہیں جدّہ میں محفوظ کر لیا تاکہ بوقت ضرورت کام آئیں۔ ،

حالات کی گردش نے پیپلز پارٹی کی قیادت سے مل بیٹھنے پر مجبور کیا۔میثاق جمہوریت کی دستاویز وجود میں آ ئی  سیاسی ٹرانزیشن کا عمل ہوا جس کے نتیجے میں پہلے بی بی اور پھر میاں صاحب کی واپسی ہوئی۔بی بی کی المناک موت کے بعد ان کی قبر پہ جا کر ان کے مشن کی تکمیل کا عزم کیا۔ وہ تو بھلا ہو پیپلز پارٹی کا جو اس صدمہء جانکاہ سے سنبھل گئی ورنہ بی بی کے مشن کا بھی میاں صاھب نے وہی کرنا تھا جو ضیاء مرحوم کے مشن کا کیا اور آج حالت یہ ہے کہ سوائے اعجازالحق کے کوئی ضیاء کا نام لینے کو تیار نہیں ہے اور یہی وجہ ہے کہ میاں صاحب آصف زرداری سے گریزاں اور بی بی کے خلاف قائم کئے گئے سوئس مقدمات  کے ریوایول پر مصر ہیں۔

ضیاء مرحوم  اپنی وراثت میں میاں صاحب کے لئے اپنے قابل سپوت اعجاز الحق کے ساتھ ساتھ جماعت اسلامی بھی چھوڑ گئے تھے۔ میاں صاحب نے کچھ عرصہ تو یہ ساتھ جاری رکھا پر شاعر کے بقول

کسی بندھن سے پیروں کی شناسائی نہیں ہوتی

یہ رومانس چل نہ سکا اور میاں صاحب جماعت اسلامی کے چند نعرے اور قابل سپوت  مستعار لے کر چلتے بنے اور قاضی صاحب کو اپنا الگ چوپال بنا کر الگ کھڑاکیں نکالنی پڑیں۔پر کیا کیا جائے کہ نعرے اور قابل فرزندان تو میاں صاحب لے اڑے اور قاضی صاحب کو پاسبان اور شباب کی نئی نرسریاں لگانی پڑگئیں۔

اب میاں صاحب جنرل ضیاء کی فکری میراث اور جماعت اسلامی کے عطا کردہ کیڈر کے سہارے مسلم لیگوں کی تاریخ کی سب سے سے کنسیسٹنٹ مسلم لیگ کے ساتھ میدان میں موجود ہیں۔ اب معاملہ کچھ یوں ہے کہ جس طرح ضیاء دور کے زیر اثر میاں صاحب موقع پرستانہ سیاسی مذہبیت سے متعارف اور بعد کے ادوار میں بہرہ ور ہونے کی وجہ سے آج تک جماعت اسلامی سے دامن نہیں چھڑا پائے اسی طرح سے مشرف کے ہاتھوں زیر عتاب رہنے کے دوران میا ں صاحب ان کی مخالفت ، پی پی پی کی صحبت اور کچھ قومی اور بین الاقوامی معروضیتوں کے باعث مایں صاحب جمہوریت، رول آف لاء، سول سوسائٹی اور فری جوڈیشری جیسی نامانوس اور ان کے فکری پس منظر سے متصادم تصورات سے متعارف ہوگئے ہیں اور نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی پیپلز پارٹی ان کے ماضی قریب کا اہم حصہ ہونے کے ناطے وہ ان تصورات سے جڑے رہنے پہ مجبور ہیں اور یہی وجہ ہے کہ ایک طرف ان سے ماضی کے رشتوں میں جڑا ان کا فطری اتّحادی دایاں بازو یعنی جماعت اسلامی اور عمران خان ان کی ہمرکابی کا خواہش مند ہے تو دوسری طرف سول سوسائٹی کا وہ حصہ جو  میاں  صاحب سے فکری یکسانیت نہ ہونے کے باوجود میاں صاحب سے امیدیں لگائے رکھنے اور ان کے ہم آواز  ہونے کا آرزو مند ہے۔

میاں صاحب بھی اپنے سیاسی تجربات کی روشنی میں کبھی ایک تو کبھی دوسرے طبقے کی داد سمیٹنے کے لئے بیانات دیتے رہتے ہیں۔ان کی اسی سیاسی ذہانت کا کمال ہے کہ جب وہ پنجاب میں جہا دیوں اور انتہا پسندوں کی سرگرمیوں سے صرف نظر کرتے ہیں تو اسے درگزر کیا جاتا ہے تو دوسری طرف جب وہ  داخلی معاملات پربین الاقوامی قیادت کے نمائندوں سے ملاقاتیں کرتے  ہوئے ان کے موقف سے ہم آہنگی پران سے تعریفی اسناد پاتے ہیں تو اس بات پر بھی ان سے امید لگائے طبقات زیادہ سیخ پا نہیں ہوتے۔

دو انتہاوءں کے بیچ میاں صاحب کا یہ سفر کب تک چلتا ہے اس پر تو کچھ کہنا قبل از وقت ہے لیکن یہ امر تو طے ہے کہ ان کی شخصیت نے مسلم لیگ کی سیاسی معروضیتوں سے ہم آہنگی کی صلاحیتوں کے باعث مسلم لیگ کو وہ استحکام عطا کیا ہے جو کہ پاکستان کی سیاسی تاریخ کے ساٹھ سالوں میں کسی مسلم لیگ کو نصیب نہ ہوسکا ۔

The National Language Debate

By Aliarqam Durrani

Famous sindhi writer and urdu columnists Amar Jaleel who recently appeared on Vussatullah’s show on Dawn News Urdu Service started a debate by saying that Jinnah was drugged or cornered into making the speech in question somehow told Bengalis to outlaw Bengali language when he declared Urdu to be the state language of Pakistan.

This is what Jinnah said

“About language, as I have already said, this is in order to create disruption amongst the Mussalmans. Your Prime Minister has rightly pointed this out in a recent statement and I am glad that his Government has decided to put down firmly any attempt to disturb the peace of this province by political saboteurs, their agents. Whether Bengali shall be official language of this province is a matter for the elected representatives of the people of this province to decide. I have no doubt that this question shall be decided solely in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants ‘of this province at the appropriate time. “
“Let me tell you in the clearest language that there is no truth that your normal life is going to be touched or disturbed so far as your Bengali language is concerned. But ultimately it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear to you that the State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function. Look at the history of other countries. Therefore, so far as the State Language is concerned, Pakistani language shall be Urdu. But, as I have said, it will come in time. ”
“Quite frankly and openly I must tell you that you have got amongst you a few communists and other agents financed by foreign help and if you are not careful, you will be disrupted. The idea that East Bengal should be brought back into the Indian Union is not given up, and it is their aim yet, and I am confident –I am not afraid, but it is better to be vigilant –that those people who still dream of getting back East Bengal into the Indian Union are living in a dream-land.
Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with me that whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. You belong to a Nation now; you have now carved out a territory, vast territory, it is all yours; it does not belong to a Punjabi or a Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; it is yours. You have got your Central Government where several units are represented. Therefore, if you want to build up yourself into a Nation, for God’s sake give up this provincialism. Provincialism has been one of the curses; and so is sectionalism –Shia, Sunni, etc. “

(Jinnah at Decca University “Jinnah Speeches And Statements 1947-1948” Millennium edition Oxford University Press)

What Jinnah said clearly relegated Bengali to the status of a regional language. That must have been difficult for Bengali nationalists to swallow. The terms ’state language, lingua franca, national language’ mean different things. Urdu could not have been a lingua franca between its two wings because Bengalis except in Dhaka perhaps would not have understood Urdu much. It was a belief in the early years that the nations needed one language to form and strengthen national identity. What happened in reaction is known history. Bengali was declared a national language within the next three or four years and that later became part of the 1956 constitution. Even in 1956 other languages such as Sindhi, Balochi, Sariaki, pushtoo and Hazara were ignored. What was the harm in declaring them national languages too?

In 1973 Constitution it was maintained as

251. National language.(1) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.

Though English is still the official language…Urdu is waiting for the status given to it by the constitution but demands from all the languages spoken i Pakistan to be declared as National Language persists…..

Fakhar Zaman, chairman of the Academy of Letters Pakistan on  Jan 27, 2005 as the chairman of World Punjabi Congress (WPC)  demanded the establishment of federal Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtu and Balochi universities on the pattern of the federal Urdu university and declaration of Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtu and Balochi as national languages, just like Urdu, rather than regional languages.

Here are two News Segment from Today News…..

Intellectuals demand national language status for Sindhi

Friday, February 26, 2010
By our correspondent

Sindhi linguists, educationists and scholars have demanded to the government that Sindhi be recognised as a national language in the province.

In this regard a draft was prepared by a nine-member committee, headed by renowned scholar and ex-chairman of Sindhi Adabi Boar Muhammad Ibrahim Joyo. The draft states that all the nationalities living in the country have already demanded that their mother tongues be declared as national languages of the country, and Urdu be made only the working language.

The nine-member committee was designed by Sindhi Language Authority (SLA), an autonomous body whose chairperson Dr Fahmida Hussain and secretary Taj Joyo are also members of the committee. Other members include former vice chancellor Sindh University Dr Ghulam Ali Alana, Director Sindh Culture Department Muhammad Ali Manjhi, renowned poet Imdad Hussaini, Secretary General Sindhi Adabi Sangat Yousaf Sindhi and others.

The draft reads that even the government-run literary institution Pakistan Academy of Letters, in 1994, declared all the languages spoken in the country are national languages. The draft termed it as an injustice with the people of Pakistan that their mother tongues are not given status of national languages.

The draft says that Sindhi is the original language of the Indus Valley people, which possesses all the peculiarities of a developed language of the world and fulfils the criteria of being a national language. It is rich in folk, classical, modern, progressive and ancient literature. People in Sindh are very much conscious and emotional about their language and culture.

The draft argues that the separation of former East Pakistan was also a result of the controversy over the national language. The draft also maintains that the language riots in Sindh urban areas in 1972 after the separation of East Pakistan were a conspiracy against the Sindhi language.

It justifies that the experts of linguistic science have set principles that any language may be declared a national language which is used by the people in their every day lives; that has been spoken by a nation from time immemorial and that is being used as official and court language and also as a medium of institutions from primary up to the higher education. Moreover, that is being used for its literary and media communication; which is able to borrow and use the words and phrases from other developed languages of the world and can transform that stock of words according to its own grammatical structure, which is originated from the language of the soil of that nation.

The draft reads that there is no clear provision regarding the national languages in the recently announced National Education Policy 2009.

Moreover, former Vice Chancellor Sindh University and author of more than 100 books, Dr Nabi Bakhsh Baloch, has expressed dissatisfaction on the role of political parties and successive governments which, according to him, never brought the language issue for discussion at major forums.

At a recently held seminar, he said that Pakistan is a multi-cultural, multi-national and multi-lingual country. At each small valley the people had their own mother tongue, which needed to be promoted at state level. He claimed that no work was done regarding the national language issue or the problems of languages in the country. He also backed Sindhi language to be declared national language.

The seminar, was a part of, ‘Sindhi Language—National Language’, a recently launched campaign for the support of the Sindhi language.

Bilour says Urdu is not national language

PESHAWAR: NWFP senior minister Bashir Ahmed Bilour triggered another controversy Friday when he declared Urdu only a language for coordination, denying its status of national language, ARY NEWS reported.

“A language can only be declared national when it is being used by the whole nation. Thus Urdu is not our national language but a language for mutual coordination among the masses,” Bilour said on assembly floor when responding to a query by MPA Moulvi Abdullah during Question Hour.

Bilour’s comments annoyed various parliamentarians from both sides of the house who criticized his statement.

On a point of order, Mufti Kifayatullah – an MPA of Jamiat Ulema Islam-F, quoted the Article 251 of the Constitution that categorically declared Urdu as Pakistan’s national language.

He said senior minister is committing an intentional violation of the Constitution despite having oath on it and sought Speaker’s ruling on the issue.

However, the opposition members walked out from the session as Speaker Karamatullah Chugharmati, who belongs to the same ruling Awami National Party (ANP) Bilour is associated with, refrained himself  from offering any solid ruling on the issue.

The same case is with Balochi, Saraiki, Barohi and Hinko also. Now Its upon us to accomodate different point of views  or be in the state of denial and declare other agents or commies or separatists as unfortunately our founding father has said in the written speech(by Ch. Muhammad Ali).

Deoband, Nationalism and Terrorism

The Ulema, Deoband and the (Many) Talibans

By : S Akbar Zaidi

Historical scholarship tends to see a continuity in the Ulema of south Asia – from the Deoband seminary in the 19th century down to the Taliban of Afghanistan and north Pakistan today. Such an assessment unfortunately ignores the discontinuities and breaks that have taken place in the traditions of Pakistani Islam. It also ignores the fact that Pakistan is increasingly influenced more by the religious influences to its west than by a south Asian identity.

An assumption is made in much of the academic and scholarly literature, usually implicitly and mostly by historians (all eminent and highly respected) that there is a line of continuity amongst the traditions of the ulema (religious scholars) of 19th century south Asia, through the seminary at Deoband (now in the Uttar Pradesh), which links them to the numerous militant movements, which bear the name of the Taliban in the northern regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I will argue that for far too many reasons, there is little, if any, continuity and there is far greater rupture which rides through any such assumed linkages and formulations. By presenting a different set of arguments, I will also argue that these ruptures also suggest that Pakistan has, finally, separated from many Indian Islamic traditions, and Muslims in India are not a “divided nation” any longer, if ever they were. Moreover, my arguments also question the use of terms such as “ulema” from one context and century to a very different set of conditions. I also argue that the issues and problems related to contemporary developments regarding militant and religio-political Islam in the early 21st century in Pakistan and Afghanistan present very different analyses and solutions than does a more historical and scholarly assessment which creates a link between tradition, learning and religious practice from 19th to the 21st century. By arguing that this is a very different nature of political Islam, analysis and solutions to address contemporary issue of “talibanisation” or militancy will have to be very different.

Time and Context

The two main aspects on which the assumption of continuity is based revolve around the term ulema and the fact that many of those who are said to belong to many forms of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan , subscribe to a “Deobandi-form” of interpretation and practice of Islam. Some scholars even draw the lineage of the new madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan from the founder of the madrasa at Deoband in 1867, Maulana Qasim Naunatvi, arguing that his “vision of a great network of madrasas” meant to “revitalise Islamic society”, seems to have been realised through the hundreds of madrasas across north Pakistan and Afghanistan . This argument is apparently reinforced when scholars emphasise the fact that the Taliban who took over Afghanistan at the end of the 1990s were students (talib singular; taliban plural) of madrasas in the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan .

The use of the term ulema (alim singular) with such ease and with such impunity is, perhaps, far more problematic than is appreciated, and, I think, underlines the main problem with this strand of analysis. Historians of languages and of society and culture are aware that the meanings of words change over time and in different contexts. The term alim, or ulema, in the 1850s and 1860s is bound to have a different meaning and connotation even in the same locality and geographical context a century-and-a-half later. The Islamic religious scholars in British India who were well-versed in literature and traditions of Islam represent a different form and being compared to those who run seminaries in modern-day Pakistan and Afghanistan , and even in India . Moreover, the social and cultural context and position of the alim in a primarily pre-modern rural society is very different from that of the religious scholars trained at seminaries today. The all encompassing term “ulema” of the 19th century does not carry the same meaning as the alim or ulema of the 21st century.

There is insufficient recognition of this transformation in the work of some scholars, who link early manifestations of Islam and its institutions – such as the madrasa and the alim – with religious learning and the representation of Islam today. Treating the term ulema largely as an unchanging category or not appreciating the extent of change, scholars have continued to use the term comparing 19th century Islam and its representation with Islam today, without sufficiently marking this change. They are using a 19th century category in a completely changed context misrepresenting the meaning of that category. In one case, this has led one scholar to imply that some of the many talibanesque militant movements in Pakistan, many of which, under a different set of definitions, have been called “terrorist” organisations, such as the Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Lashkar-e-Toiba, are led by the ulema. Clearly, the “alim” of the Lashkar-e-Toiba is not the same as the alim of the 19th or even early 20th century. The alim as a religious scholar is a very different category and entity from the “alim” as politician or jihadi.


Moreover, in some cases, using a largely religious paradigm, in which the notion of the ulema plays a key role, scholars have tried to look at sectarianism in Pakistan, where theoretical or literalist arguments are presented, supposedly suggesting why the Shias and the Sunnis have been at war with each other for some years in parts of Pakistan. While there is no doubt that there are huge religious differences between the Shia and the Sunni in modern Pakistan , the manifestation and form of sectarianism is based less on theological disputation and far more on modern politics, often very petty and localised. In the context of Pakistan at least, and presumably in Afghanistan as well, Shia-Sunni differences, or sectarianism, can be easily understood in their local political, often turf-related, contexts, rather than in debates following the succession of the Prophet of Islam. This is particularly so in parts of the Pakistani Punjab where sectarianism has been particularly violent and brutal, often fought out in running gun battles between “militant” Sunni and Shia armed squads. While the mantle of the alim is often used to spur on such hatred, it is often a political feud which is fought through these means rather than primarily a religious or theological one.

Furthermore, in Pakistan , there is ample documentary evidence which shows quite conclusively, that religious groups are led and run not by the ulema, but by leaders trained by the military. The role of the Inter-Services Intelligence and other covert state actors in fermenting sectarianism and giving financial and military support to numerous jihadi outfits is well known. It is not the ulema who lead or inspire these movements, but arms, money and military training. Of course, one cannot deny the religious zeal and fanaticism which brings young men to such organisations, but it is improbable that it is merely the training given by “religious scholars” which does so. And indeed, if they are religious scholars who are urging their students to wage jihad, they certainly are not the ulema of the 19th century mould.

Flawed Assumptions

The third major problem with this line of analysis has been that it refers to the Taliban and their many off-shoots, as “Deobandi Islam”. Arguing that the curriculum of these madrasas is still based on a form of the 18th and 19th century Dars-i-Nizamiyya curriculum of what later became Deobandi Islam, the suggestion that this tradition continues has made scholars and historians argue that the Taliban are Deobandis. In some, very basic and elementary ways they are right. There are ample traces of the Deobandi form of Islam in the teachings of madrasas in Pakistan , despite the fact that a larger proportion of Pakistanis follow the less austere, Barelwi Islam. Nevertheless, one must recognise that while the different Taliban groups may have had some access and pedagogic training in madrasas, the Deobandi component of whatever training they would have received would have been minimal. From the few studies that have been conducted of madrasas and their curriculum in Pakistan, the evidence clearly shows a hotchpotch of what is taught, ranging from elements of theological teachings originating in the Dars-i-Nizamiyya, but also including “modern” education, as well as what can only be called indoctrination and the spreading of hatred against other religious factions. To call such pedagogy Deobandi is correct only in a very broad, general, sense, and while many of the jihadis may still call themselves Deobandi, the assumption that this type of teaching is related to the original madrasa at Deoband is overstretched.

Moreover, a fact recognised by many scholars, but perhaps not enough, is the impact of the Gulf and especially of Saudi Arabian Wahabi Islam on these jihadi movements. In terms of funding andindoctrination, Wahabi Islam now seems to dominate the more militant elements in the broad spectrum of Pakistani Islam. Again, perhaps it is less the theological part of Wahabi Islam that is transmitted, and the more militant and jihadi characteristics are passed on as knowledge and training.

I will maintain that as Pakistan ’s politics and economy have moved towards west Asia and away from an Indian history and past, its various Islams have also been influenced by these trends. Pakistan ’s version of Deobandi Islam is affected by Saudi Wahabism, and hence it becomes difficult to argue that these madrasas are still, in any real sense, Deobandi. Moreover, while it is true that many of the Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan were set-up after Partition by Deoband-trained scholars of the 1930s and 1940s, given Pakistan ’s and India ’s political and diplomatic relationship over the last 60 years. Deobandi Islam in Pakistan today is bound to be very different from Deobandi Islam in Deoband, or anywhere else in northern India .

The final point that needs to be made in any line of reasoning which looks at continuity is the ruptures that have taken place in the form and notion of religio-political Islam, from the early 20th century of Maulana Maudoodi or Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to the militant and political Islam of the 21st century of Mulla Omar, Osama bin Laden, or Maulana Mahmood Azhar of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Islam, even Pakistani and Afghani Islam, is now globalised, Wahabiised, as well as affected by geopolitical influences which have a far-reaching impact on local and domestic Islam. In a post-11September 2001 world and in the region, Islam’s forms, politics as well as its religious and perhaps even theological components would have undergone huge change and reinterpretation as well.

The ruptures in the streams of ideas related to the continuities in history need to be rethought and the use of terms better contextualised, if at all one is to learn any lessons from the past.

The Roots Of Article 62 & 63

Extracts from Husain Haqqani’s Article

Islamist Parties and Democracy

JoD, July 2008, Volume 19, Number 3

More substantively, however, the potential or actual force of the Islamist legacy is bound up with the question of the status of shari‘a. As has often been observed, the shari‘a understood as divine law and thus as the will of God stands in tension with any alternative understanding of legislation as deriving from human will, as expressed for instance via the decisions of elected legislators. But as a practical matter, of course, even the divine law requires human intermediation for its implementation, and this intermediation has taken various forms over the course of Muslim history.

In practice, the issue for contemporary democracy and especially liberal democracy will turn on whether an Islamist party and the state that it might govern can admit the legitimacy of some political and legal authority in addition to (and somehow combined with) the authority of Islamic law. From the point of view of liberal democracy, such a party and state would have to accept (if only tacitly) the principles of a private sphere and of individual rights—principles by which liberal democracy stands or falls. Such a sphere might permit—but would not require—the private adherence to Islamic law.
In terms of electoral politics, the issue might be stated as follows:
How do or will Islamist parties define the minimum qualifications of electors and candidates for office? Is every adult citizen a potential candidate for office and electoral participation? Or are the franchise and office to be restricted either to Muslims in general or, even more menacingly, only to those Muslims who conform to Islamist standards—that is to say, those who are “true Muslims” rather than “Muslim unbelievers” or “backsliders” or “neopagans.” Mawdudi used the terms “Muslim by choice” and “Muslim by chance” to distinguish between the two categories. The latter is a category that has come to figure prominently in
contemporary Islamist discourse. Jihadist groups have used it to justify the murder of other Muslims, especially Muslim rulers and their allies. Islamist parties might use it to legitimize the idea of refusing to give up power after they have won office through elections. Hence the fear that Islamism will lead to dictatorships of the pious modeled on communism’s dictatorships of the proletariat.

As mentioned above, Muslim political history shows some variability in the implementation of Islamic law. Indeed, the determination and implementation of Islamic law were often matters handled in the “private sphere” by clerics lacking political power. At least after the time of Muhammad and his immediate successors, Islamic jurisprudence developed largely at some distance from the rulers of the polity. This wasresponsible for the well-known fact that Islamic law comes in at least four major “schools” or variants. The adherence to Islamic law coexisted with the separate and de facto superior authority of Muslim political rulers and their various dynasties. Thus Muslim experience does not lack for a variety of political arrangements within which separate layers or spheres of law can be present at the same time. Indeed, such a variety exists today in the practices of various Muslim countries.

It is difficult to say, however, what bearing this might have on Islamists political practice, since the original Islamist impulse was to regard this variability, whether noted in the past or the present, as a sign that all was not well in the Muslim world. It is of course possible that Islamist parties might come to rethink this matter—initially perhaps as a matter of necessity in the face of countervailing political forces, and then more positively through the elaboration of a new political theory.But the latter has certainly not occurred yet, and the former has so far produced results that, as the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood shows, must be called ambiguous at best.

After the Bangladesh Models….

By Aliarqam Durrani

The very much debated NRO and the SC judgment about it has clearly indicated the tendencies of our political class and the non political forces of a journey in the circle. Unfortunately biases and prejudices have prevailed on the objectiveness and realistic approaches.All the efforts from the non political forces of the state to haunt the political classes were applauded by the politicians also. In Pakistan restoration of democratic process is known to be a short gap for the establishment to recover from the dents of credibility and the mess they have generated in dealing every issue in an autocratic way. In this rest period they try their best to once again blame the political forces for their past failures and to get rid of their garbage. The story is repeated again and again here and in our brother country Bangladesh. In the current situations some voices are demanding or proposing the famous Bangladesh model of an unelected setup backed by the military, as this type of setup suit all those self acclaimed analysts, technocrats and retired bureaucrats and ex- ambassadors to enjoy public offices without involving in the painstaking ways of popular politics.

But what is happening in Bangladesh is more desperate for the thinking minds(if the do so) of the establishment. After the cleansing efforts of the Bangladesh setup the result is disappointing for them. As AL returned with overwhelming majority. Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is formed. Bangla courts have shared the responsibility of guarding democratic process with the ruling Awami League and political forces. They have put steps toward abuse of religious ideas in politics(though a long way) and now on the initiative the courts are proposing an NRO for the political workers and leadership to counter the non political forces…

The News Extract from a Bangla Newspaper is worth mentioned in the present political scenario of our own.

411 more ‘politically motivated cases be bundled out

(Staff reporter) The government has decided that 411 more ‘politically motivated cases be bundled out, as the charges were leveled against the ruling-party persons during the immediate-past interim regime or the previous BNP-led coalition on political considerations.

An official source said the decision was taken at the 12th meeting of the inter-ministerial committee formed to deal with such cases filed with the ill intention of “political harassment”. A total of 869 cases, including 824 under the penal code and 45 under the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), were placed at the meeting. This bunch also contains none of the cases filed against BNP-Jamaat leaders and workers amid a massive anti-graft drive conducted by the army-led interim government under state of emergency following the 1/11 changeover. Of the 411 cases recommended for withdrawal, one is against Habibur Rahman Mollah MP and another against former MP Alhaj Mokbul Hossain, said Adv Qumrul Islam, chairman of the inter-ministerial body and also State Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. He said that of the 45 cases filed by the ACC, the committee decided to drop 23 cases, 20 for further scrutiny and rejected another two cases. On the cases under penal code, he informed that they have decided to drop 388 cases, 374 cases for further scrutiny and another 62 cases were not recommended for withdrawal. “We are human beings and we can make error. But, we are making critical analysis in making recommendations so that no criminal can get the opportunity of case withdrawal,” he said in reply to a question. He informed that they would need around two months more time to finish the process of recommending withdrawal of politically motivated cases. Replying to another question, the State Minister said till the day’s meeting, they had recommended withdrawal of 2,380 cases. The central panel has so far received the applications on 6,793 cases from the district-level committees. About the rejected cases, he said they decided to reject pleas for those cases on which they reached firm decision that those are not politically motivated. “We have rejected those cases which are not politically motivated cases by any means.” Adv. Qumrul told another questioner that the ACC would take their own decision following their case-withdrawal recommendations. “The ACC is fully independent and there is no scope for making intervention into their work.” Asked whether any cases were withdrawn, he said some cases were withdrawn following their recommendations and some are under process, but could not mention the figures. State Minister for Home Affairs Adv. Shamsul Haque Tuku and his Ministry high officials were present. Earlier, a central scrutiny committee under the Home Ministry, and committees in all the districts were formed to identify politically motivated cases. In February, the government invited applications seeking cancellation of such cases. The deadline for petitioning was extended thrice up to July 12.

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